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Abstract
This paper discusses some of the challenges that organizations face when trying to make
enterprise systems work. Using critical ethnography, we studied the implementation of an
enterprise system in a small-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate in Australasia.
We found that organizational learning around strategically important issues failed to occur. This
failure to learn negatively impacted the implementation of the enterprise system. We use the
theory of organizational defensive routines to help explain this failure.
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Introduction
There is a substantial and growing research
literature concerned with the implementation
of enterprise systems. Many different aspects
of enterprise systems implementation have
been considered, such as the critical success
factors for implementation (Nah et al., 2001,
Umble et al., 2003), the need for user
participation (Kawalek and Wood-Harper,
2002), or how the implementation strategy
needs to take account of different
organizational
or
national
cultures
(Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001). One
important topic within this literature has been
the
subject
of
enterprise
systems
implementation failure. Since enterprise
systems often involve the entire organization
and
are
large,
complex
systems,
implementation failure is not uncommon
[Larsen and Myers, 1999]. Some IS
researchers have pointed out that it is
important for us to learn from such failures
(Scott and Vessey, 2000).
This paper therefore contributes to the
literature on the implementation of enterprise
systems and to the literature on IS
implementation failure more generally (Myers,
1994; Sauer et al., 1999). In particular we
focus on one particular aspect of enterprise
systems implementation, viz. organizational
learning. Organizational learning is important,
particularly during times of transition from one
technology to another (Boudreau and Robey,
2005).
In the company that we studied, there were
many political issues surrounding the
development and implementation of the
enterprise system. In this organization,
enterprise integration was a corporate battle
ground – it was the issue over which a
political conflict between two camps was
fought. However, in this paper we focus on
just one aspect: the failure to learn. Our
analysis shows that many issues were not
debated productively because of the failure to
overcome organizational defensive routines.
These organizational defensive routines

meant there was a failure to learn, which
negatively impacted the implementation of
the new ERP system. Hence, the primary
contribution of this paper is that it is one of
the first to focus on the need for
organizational learning in enterprise systems
implementation, or more precisely, how
failure to learn may contribute to
implementation failure.
The organization was a small-to-medium
sized enterprise within a large conglomerate
within Australasia, called Stark (all names are
pseudonyms
in
accordance
with
a
confidentiality agreement). Stark was one of
many subsidiaries within the Solteria group
(one of the global 500 companies with annual
revenues of more than US$4 billion). One of
the authors studied Stark using critical
ethnography.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we review the research literature on
enterprise systems. In Section 3 we discuss
our theoretical framework. Section 4 explains
our research method. In Section 5 we present
our data on the history of enterprise
integration at Stark. Section 6 analyzes and
discusses the data. The final section is the
conclusion.

Literature Review
Defining Enterprise Systems
ERP systems, or “enterprise systems” for
short, have been defined as “comprehensive,
packaged software solutions [that] seek to
integrate the complete range of a business’
processes and functions in order to present a
holistic view of the business from a single
information and IT architecture” (Gable, 1998).
In practice, however, companies with multiple
sites may have different ERP configurations
(Bhattacherjee, 2000; Markus et al., 2000).
The conglomerate we studied, for example,
was a large, highly diversified international
conglomerate. Its various subsidiaries had
over a dozen different ERP systems from all
the major vendors! In this kind of situation,
the concept of one tightly integrated package
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for the entire enterprise is not feasible
(although it may be feasible for individual
companies within the conglomerate to have
one ERP system).
A somewhat broader definition of ERP is
offered by Shanks and Seddon (2000).
Focusing more on the shared information and
data flows that enable integration of
enterprise-wide processes, they define ERP
as “comprehensive packaged software
solutions
that
integrate
organizational
processes through shared information and
data flows.” In a later work, (Shanks et al.,
2003) describe three characteristics of an
enterprise system:
1. A set of integrated packaged application
software modules
2. Impounds deep knowledge of business
practices accumulated by vendors
3. A generic ‘semi-finished’ product with
tables and parameters that must be
configured to meet business needs.
From the above discussion, one can observe
that the term “enterprise systems” is evolving.
Also, over time, more and more features are
being incorporated into enterprise systems
(Davenport, 2000b).

Enterprise Systems
Implementation
Recent research has emphasized the
importance of the social, cultural and
organizational
aspects
in
ERP
implementation (e.g., Krumbholz and Maiden,
2001; Larsen and Myers, 1999; Lee et al.,
2003; Markus and Tanis, 2000; Soh et al.,
2000). For example, Hanseth and Braa (1999)
studied the ability of one organization to
change after the ERP system had been
implemented. They found that the dream of
standardization was like “hunting for the
treasure at the end of the rainbow” (Hanseth
and Braa, 1999). Other IS researchers have
focused specifically on the role of power and

politics in ERP implementations (Allen and
Kern, 2001; Koch, 2001).
There are several ways enterprise systems
may support, enable or constrain certain
corporate strategic initiatives (Davenport,
2000b; Markus and Tanis, 2000). For
example, SAP assumes a translation from
strategy to strategic objectives to key
performance indicators to the key processes
that are in turn supported by the SAP system
(SAP, 2001). This translation is assumed to
be one way, from strategy to processes. In
SAP’s worldview, the relationship between
strategy, critical success factors, general (key)
performance
indicators,
measurable
performance indicators, processes and subprocesses is central to the implementation of
an enterprise system. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.
In analyzing the relationship between strategy
and business processes, SAP has been
influenced by Porter’s value chain (Porter and
Millar, 1985). In Figure 2, for example, SAP
promotes the benefits of an enterprise
systems implementation by using Porter’s
value chain concept.
Thus we can see that certain strategic
paradigms have permeated the way
enterprise
systems
are
implemented.
Enterprise systems are often seen as a
means of implementing corporate strategy
(e.g., Davenport, 2000a; Kalling, 2003;
Markus and Tanis, 2000).
In the organization we studied, as the
dominant actors, coalitions, and political
agendas changed over time, so too did the
company’s enterprise integration strategy. In
effect, the company’s enterprise integration
strategy was a corporate battleground. Within
the context of this corporate battleground,
organizational defensive routines hindered
the achievement of better understanding
between parties to resolve strategically
important issues. It is this failure to learn that
is the focus of this paper.
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Analyze your Performance Indicators
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creation  Goods issue

Sales order
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Copyright ? 2000 SAP AG. All rights reserved Accelerated SAP

Figure 1 - Relationship between Strategy, Strategic Objectives, Critical Success
Factors, General (Key) Performance Indicators and Measurable Performance
Indicators (adapted from SAP, 2001)
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Figure 2 - SAP’s and Cap Gemini Consulting’s View of How Porter’s Value Chain
Relates to Benefits that Can Come from an ERP project (adapted from SAP 2001)
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Enterprise Systems
Implementation and
Organizational Learning
The literature on organizational learning
emerged in the organizational sciences
(Argyris, 1990; Huber, 1991; Simon, 1991)
and has now started to influence IS
research (Ke et al., 2003; Scott and Vessey,
2000). Robey at al. (2002) identified
practices to address knowledge barriers
such as development and maintenance of
strong core teams, managing consulting
relationships, user training in technical and
business processes along with a phased
implementation. Scott and Vessey (2000)
applied Sitkins’ (1992) learning framework
to gain insight into IS implementation
success and failure. Applying organizational
learning from another angle, Ke at al. (2003)
adopted Crossan et al.’s (1999) framework
to derive insights into organizational
learning at three levels – individual, group
and organization. Boudreau and Robey
looked at improvised learning which they
define as “Learning situated in practice,
initiated by users, and implemented without
any predetermined structure, schedule, or
method” [Boudreau and Robey, 2005, p. 9].
They suggest that improvised learning is an
important process facilitating the transition
from one enactment of technology to
another. Learning is accomplished through
the improvised contributions of multiple
actors in an organization’s social networks
(Boudreau and Robey, 2005).
One of the theories within the organizational
learning literature is the theory of
organizational defensive routines. In this
paper we use this theory to help explain
how organizational learning may be
hindered during the implementation of
enterprise systems. This theory is discussed
in the following section.

Theoretical Background
Although there are many different
perspectives and theories within the

organizational learning literature, the theory
of defensive routines is one of the most
well-known. The theory was originally
developed by Argyris and Schon (Argyris,
1993b; Argyris and Schon, 1978) and has
been used in the organizational learning
movement (Argyris and Schon, 1996; Kim,
1993;
Senge,
1990),
in
general
management (Senge, 1990), and system
dynamics
(Sterman, 2000). A few
researchers have also used this theory in
information systems (Henfridsson and
Soderholm, 2000; Sallaway, 1987).
The theory of organizational defensive
routines is based on the theory of action
perspective. Argyris and Schon based this
perspective in part on Bateson’s (1972) four
levels of learning. However, Argyris and
Schon (1978) have adopted only three of
the four levels of learning: single loop,
double loop and deutero learning (learning
to learn).
Within the theory of action perspective an
organization has a theory of action that
consists
of
strategies,
norms
and
assumptions. For example, a vendor of
enterprise software might have strategies
that provide the rationale for using valueadded resellers rather than dealing with
customers directly. It might also have norms
for performance such as a 20 percent per
annum growth rate. Also, there would be
assumptions that utilizing the resellers in a
particular manner will be the most costeffective way to conduct business. (Note
that the term “strategy” used within the
theory of action perspective differs slightly
from the other notions of corporate strategy
(e.g., Porter, 1996). We distinguish this by
using the term “theory-of-action strategy”).
Single loop learning occurs when correction
is done to the process through changes in
theory-of-action
strategies
and/or
assumptions;
however
the
norms
themselves do not undergo change. Double
loop learning, on the other hand, involves
changes in norms as well as perhaps
theory-of-action strategies or assumptions.
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Deutero learning, the third kind of learning,
involves learning how to learn. Put in
another way, single loop learning does not
involve a change in the master program (or
the governing values mentioned below) that
causes the organization to perpetuate errors
but double loop learning does (Argyris,
1993a).
Organizational defensive routines are
defined as “actions or policies that prevent
individuals or segments of the organisation
from experiencing embarrassment or threat.
Simultaneously, they prevent people from
identifying and getting rid of the causes of
the potential embarrassment or threat.
Organisational defensive routines are antilearning, overprotective, and self-sealing”
(Argyris, 1990). These defensive routines
are rooted in what Argyris and Schon call
the Model I type of human behaviour
summarized in Table 1.
The four governing values in the left column
of the table represent norms and
interpretive
schemas
that
underlie
unproductive action strategies. As a result
of these values, unintended consequences
of action such as a manager being seen as
defensive, inconsistent, or controlling occur.
When this happens, it is difficult to enter into
productive dialogue to question the
underlying assumptions of a course of
action. Eventually, this manager does not
revise some faulty assumptions, leading to
decreased long term effectiveness.
Argyris and Schon distinguish between
Model I social virtues (counter-productive
behaviours that inhibit double loop learning)
and Model II social virtues (complementary
behaviours that facilitate double loop
learning). These two models are described
in Table 2.
Model II social virtues are based on the
governing values of “valid information”,
“informed
choice”
and
“individual
responsibility to monitor how well the choice
is
implemented.”
This
individual

responsibility includes monitoring how well
one designs and implements his or her
decisions in order to detect and correct
errors. These governing values form the
foundation for two action strategies:


Advocate
one’s
position
and
encourage inquiry or confirmation of
it. This action strategy involves
forthrightly expressing one’s views
while providing illustrations of fairly
observable data, e.g., what was
seen and heard. The reason for
doing so is to invite examination and
discussion of the reasoning process
that has led to one’s conclusion.



Minimization of unilateral facesaving. Actions taken to save face,
for yourself or someone else, are
considered an act of mistrust of the
other person’s capacities. Such acts
should be assessed.

These action strategies have been found to
lead to productive reasoning where
individuals make their premises and
inferences explicit and clear (Argyris, 1990).
The use of defensive routines as a lens
helps us understand why actors may not be
able to resolve contradictions inherent in
organizational life. However, the theory of
defensive routines has its limitations. For
example, the theory of defensive routines
assumes that organizational members
altruistically want to solve the problems they
see around them. However, altruistic goals
may not be the same for every group. Also,
the theory does not cater for situations
where actors purposely act to fulfil their
hidden agendas at the expense of the
organization. Additionally, we acknowledge
that the theory was developed in the West
by Western scholars, and hence it may not
be applicable in all situations or in different
cultures. We mention some additional
limitations of the theory after our discussion
of the analysis and findings.
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Table 1 - Model I Theory-in-Use
Governing
values

Action Strategies

Consequences for
behavioural world

Consequences
for learning

Effectiveness

Define goals
and try to
achieve them

Design and manage the
environment unilaterally. (Be
persuasive, appeal to larger
goals, etc.)

Self-sealing

Decreased
long term
effectiveness

Maximize
winning and
minimize
losing
Minimize
generating or
expressing
negative
feelings

Own and control the task. (Claim
ownership of the task, be
guardian of the definition and
execution of the task.)
Unilaterally protect yourself.
(Speak in inferred categories
accompanied by little or no
directly observable data, be
blind to impact on others and to
incongruity between rhetoric and
behaviour, reduce incongruity by
defensive actions such as
blaming, stereotyping,
suppressing feelings,
intellectualizing etc.)
Unilaterally protect others from
being hurt (withhold information,
create rules to censor
information and behaviour, hold
private meetings).

Actor seen as
defensive, inconsistent,
incongruent,
controlling, fearful of
being vulnerable,
withholding of feelings,
overly concerned about
self and others
Defensive interpersonal
and group relationship
(dependence on actor,
little helping of others).
Defensive norms
(mistrust, lack of risktaking, conformity,
external commitment,
emphasis on
diplomacy, powercentred competition
and rivalry).

Be rational

Single-loop
learning

Little testing of
theories publicly
Much testing of
theories privately

Low freedom of choice,
internal commitment
and risk-taking.

Table 2 - Comparison between Model I and Model II Social Virtues
Model I Social Virtues

Model II Social Virtues
Help and Support

Give approval and praise to others. Tell others what
you believe will make them feel good about
themselves. Reduce their feelings of hurt by telling
them how much you care, and if possible, agree with
them that the others acted improperly.

Increase the others’ capacity to confront their own
ideas, to create a window into their own mind, and to
face their un-surfaced assumptions, biases, and fears
by acting in these ways toward other people.

Respect for Others
Defer to other people and do not confront their
reasoning or actions.

Attribute to other people a high capacity for selfreflection and self-examination without becoming so
upset that they lose their effectiveness and their sense
of self-responsibility and choice. Keep testing this
attribution opening.

Strength
Advocate your position in order to win. Hold your own
position in the face of advocacy. Feeling vulnerable is a
sign of weakness.

Advocate your position and combine it with inquiry and
self-reflection. Feeling vulnerable while encouraging
inquiry is a sign of strength.

Honesty
Tell other people no lies or tell others all you think and
feel.

Encourage yourself and other people to say what they
know yet fear to say. Minimize what would otherwise
be subject to distortion and cover-up of the distortion.

Integrity
Stick to your principles, values and beliefs.

Advocate your principles, values and beliefs in a way
that invites inquiry into them and encourages other
people to do the same.
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Research Method
As was mentioned earlier, one of the authors
studied Stark – one of many subsidiaries
within the Solteria group - using critical
ethnography. Ethnographic research has
emerged as one important method for
studying the social and organizational
contexts of IS development and use (Harvey
and Myers, 1995). One of the strengths of
ethnography is that it is one of the most “indepth” or “intensive” research methods
possible. The distinguishing feature of
ethnography is that ethnographers immerse
themselves in the life of the people they study,
and seek to place the phenomena studied in
their social and cultural context (Myers, 1999).
As Myers explains,
The main difference between case study
research and ethnographic research is
the length of time that the investigator is
required to spend in the field and the
extent to which the researcher immerses
himself or herself in the life of the social
group under study. In a case study, the
primary source of data is interviews,
supplemented by documentary evidence
such as annual reports, minutes of
meetings and so forth. In an ethnography,
these data sources are supplemented by
data collected through participant
observation.
Ethnographies
usually
require the researcher to spend a long
period of time in the “field” (Myers, 1999).
Critical ethnography is one particular kind of
ethnographic research (Myers, 1997). Critical
ethnography sees ethnographic research as
emergent process, involving a dialogue
between the ethnographer and the people in
the research setting (Myers, 1999). Critical
ethnographers describe, analyze, and open
to scrutiny otherwise hidden agendas, power
centers, and assumptions that inhibit, repress,
and constrain (Thomas, 1993). We believe
that the research method was particularly
appropriate given the subject matter. It would
be virtually impossible for a researcher to

discover organizational defensive routines,
hidden agendas and assumptions if they
were not “there” for an extended period of
time.
The data was obtained over a six-year period
in total, from 1996-2001, with the most
intensive period of fieldwork relevant to
enterprise systems implementation being
from August 1999 to August 2000. For the
first year, one of the authors used the indepth case study methodology to research
the link between quality management and
organizational learning at one of subsidiaries
of Stark. It was then that the issue of
defensive routines as a hindrance to effective
resolution of issues was identified.
Critical ethnography was adopted in later
stages of the study. As with ethnography
more generally, the research project was
highly iterative and emergent [Agar, 1986].
Data sources included interviews, informal
chats, meetings, observation, the company’s
Intranet, and various documents such as emails, annual reports, and newspaper articles.
One hundred and five formal interviews were
conducted (most of which were audio taped)
with 69 people during the most intensive
period
of
fieldwork.
Many
informal
discussions with employees also took place.
As well as interviews, meetings were
attended at various levels and departments.

Enterprise Integration at Stark
Stark is a small-to-medium sized enterprise
within a large conglomerate within Australasia
(called Solteria). Solteria was one of the
global 500 companies with annual revenues
of more than US$4 billion. The organisation
structure of the Solteria empire for the year
2000 is shown in the next figure (with the
reporting line for Flavion, SEKTOR and Stark
highlighted, and the subsidiaries of the other
divisions omitted).
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Solteria

Sharpe Associates

Konstructor

CeremCo

Flavion Division

General Products

Xenon

BlackBird Industries

SEKTOR

Stark
Industries Limited

Trimark Limited

Manufacturing

PipeCo

RockCo

Figure 3 - Organizational Structure of Solteria Limited (2000)
Stark employs around 700 people and is now
comprised of five businesses: CamCo,
MaxCo, HinoCo, DrinCo and ModCo. Prior to
November 1999, Xenon was also part of
Stark.

1993 - A Change of Strategy
In February 1993 David Callon assumed the
role of general manager of Stark. Prior to his
arrival, the three business units  MaxCo,
Xenon and CamCo  were merged to form a
new entity: Stark Industries Limited. An
enterprise integration movement now began
at Stark. Stark was restructured along
regional lines to achieve greater market
awareness and customer focus (this was in
contrast to the previous emphasis on
production). With the reorganization also
came the consolidation of administrative
centres.
Under David Callon there was a change of
strategy for the company. It was decided that
Stark would no longer focus on production,
but would become the marketing arm of the
SEKTOR Group of companies. Stark would
focus on the creation of new markets, the
transformation of its product-oriented mindset
and culture to one of providing customers
with end-user system solutions, and
differentiation through better service. Stark
believed that it had to transform itself from a
traditional product-focused business to a
service-oriented business.

After this strategic review, Stark undertook
many projects with the aim of developing a
new corporate identity, developing new
corporate capabilities, and changing the
organization. One of these was a Strategic
Information Technology Project (SITP).

1995 - The ERP Project
The Strategic Information Technology Project
was undertaken from June 1994 to May 1995
and was assisted by a large global consulting
company (herein called BigFive Consulting).
Stark recognized that the information systems
of Stark needed to be linked to its strategic
business plan.
The primary objective of the SITP was “to
achieve greater integrity, reliability, timeliness
and usefulness of information available to
Stark management.” The SITP team with the
help of BigFive Consulting recommended that
“Stark seek an integrated packaged software
product to support all if not most of the
business functions.” The new system was
expected to support a new re-engineered
process, namely, the centralized order
acceptance and delivery process for Stark.
This would involve a new centralized order
acceptance and delivery centre that would
centralize order acceptance and delivery
across MaxCo, CamCo and Xenon. After a
long software search period, Stark selected
DAREA (a pseudonym for one of the top five
ERP vendors in the world).
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The new system was chosen to support a
corporate culture and work environment that
was yet to be created. This new corporate
world would involve the consolidation not only
of plants within CamCo (that were currently
competing against each other) but also of the
three main businesses of Stark.
Traditionally, most of the companies within
the Solteria empire were fairly autonomous.
The Solteria conglomerate as a whole had a
cultural norm of commensurate authority,
responsibility and accountability at the
business unit level. However, this cultural
norm was now diametrically opposed to what
was proposed with the new ERP system.
Although the sister companies were not used
to collaborating with each other, the new
system would require a certain degree of
cooperation and process standardization.

The centralized
system

order

working at the centralized order acceptance
and delivery centre! This worker did not
identify with, neither did they want to learn
about, the other businesses of Stark.

Old-timers versus New-timers
At the highest level of Stark, there were two
groups: the New-timers and the Old-timers.
The New-timers were comprised of the then
general manager of Stark, David Callon, and
several senior managers. The New-timers
believed that new technology was needed to
improve the business.
The Old-timers believed the business was as
simple as it always had been. Therefore,
these new initiatives served only to overcomplicate the business. In their opinion,
there were only a few fundamental things one
needed to do to run the business well.

processing

A new centralized order acceptance and
delivery centre was established for all of the
Stark companies, replacing the ones that had
existed within each Stark subsidiary. The
locally-based order processing facilities were
closed down in the interests of creating a
more tightly integrated enterprise. However,
the new centre did not function as expected.
Not once did a customer place an order for
three different kinds of products from the
three business units at the same time (one of
the rationales for installing the system). Also,
the centre was never able to achieve the goal
of on-time predictable delivery (touted earlier
as a key differentiator for competitive
advantage). This was mostly because certain
powerful figures within Stark were able to
over-ride the system in order to satisfy the
demands of large customers (this is
discussed in more detail below). Also, given
that Stark was formed from three adversarial,
previously competing firms, the workers at
the centralized centre still tended to identify
themselves more with their own subsidiary
than Stark as a whole. We observed a former
order taker of MaxCo complaining of doing
CamCo’s work, even though they were now

Wyatt Dunkins, the current leader of the Oldtimers, had been with Stark since the early
1980s and had been part of the team that
expanded the business. He was considered
one of the most powerful figures in Stark.

1997-1998: The Strategic Debates
Although Stark had yet to fully implement its
new ERP system, there were debates at
senior levels of Solteria and Flavion on the
fundamental role that Stark would play within
the Sector. Wyatt Dunkins, one of the Oldtimers, lobbied for a change in Stark’s
strategic role and enterprise integration
strategy with the CEOs of SEKTOR and
Flavion. He argued that the three main
businesses of Stark should be managed in a
more separate manner. The end result of
these debates was a decision to change
Stark from a marketing arm of SEKTOR to
that of production i.e. back to what it was
before! In late 1998 Gene Romm succeeded
David Callon as the new CEO of Stark.
[The change of Stark’s strategic role has]
certainly taken place since I left [in
December 1998]. But [it was] starting to
take place a little bit over the
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implementation [of] Project Bridge.
We’re challenging, at senior levels in
Solteria about what role Stark was to
have inside the SEKTOR [group of
companies] – whether it was about
strategic growth or whether it was just an
operating unit that was at the end of the
value chain and we wanted to keep it
tight and simple. (Interview with David
Callon, General Manager of Stark from
1993 to 1998).

1999: New Leader, Different Vision
Gene Romm did not share the same
integrated company vision as David Callon.
Instead of a tightly integrated company, Gene
Romm espoused a clearer separation
between MaxCo, CamCo and the individual
businesses of Stark. This stood in contrast to
the previous CEOs view that Stark’s
businesses should be tightly coordinated. As
Gene Romm explains:
I think Stark’s application of DAREA is
wrong… The software itself is not the
issue, it’s how the business chooses to
use it. And in my judgment one of the
mistakes that Stark has made is they’ve
modified it far too much and the
fundamental business model that Stark
set out to put together for DAREA is
wrong.
They assumed that Xenon,
CamCo and MaxCo were all one
business, in simple terms, and they’re
not. They are three separate businesses
and we may manage them as one but
they are still three separate businesses.
And they should be “informationized” as
three
different
businesses
not
“informationized” as if they are one
(Interview with Gene Romm, General
Manager of Stark from December 1998
onwards).
The previous enterprise integration strategy
for Stark was now starting to unravel.

2000: Post-Implementation
By the end of 1999, Stark had managed to
roll-out DAREA throughout the whole country.

However, Stark employees generally hated
DAREA. Worse, many senior managers
believed that DAREA had been a bad
investment. The new CEO of the SEKTOR
group thought that DAREA was inferior to
another ERP product usually used widely
throughout the group.
In February 2000 the ERP Support team at
Stark considered various options to upgrade
DAREA to a later version. However, given the
latest business strategy for Stark, they
decided to move towards splitting the “sales
and distribution” tables shared by MaxCo and
CamCo. In hindsight, they considered that
these two businesses were too tightly
integrated.
In summary, we can see that David Callon,
appointed CEO in 1993, had a strategy of
creating a tightly integrated, service-oriented
company. DAREA was chosen and
implemented to support that strategy.
However, David Callon, along with his
strategy, left in 1999. Of the twelve managers
who signed off the ERP project at the start,
only three were left by December 2000.
Now Stark had a new CEO and a new
strategic vision. This strategic vision was
diametrically opposed to David Callon’s vision,
but almost identical to what it had been
before he came along. This meant that
DAREA was designed for a world that would
never exist.
“It didn’t take a 180 degree turn but it,
sort of - we were quite expansionist and
visionary and we came back to a very
conservative operational [focus] and …
so it wasn’t a dramatic change but it was
more a degree of how expansionist we
would have been had we wound the dial
back a little bit to be more conservative.
But that – that did have an implication on
[the] DAREA [project]. And would we
have chosen DAREA or a similar ERP
system if we had the more conservative
vision? Probably not.” (Interview with
David Callon, initiator of the ERP project
when he was the General Manager of
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Stark from 1993 to 1998, emphasis
added)

Analysis and Discussion
In this section we will analyze our data using
three themes: conflict of strategic paradigms,
influence
of
dominant
actors,
and
organizational defensive routines.

Just one year later, the reengineered
centralized order acceptance and delivery
centre was split. The individual companies of
Stark were once again responsible for their
own order processing and product delivery.
This put an end to the dream of “mission
control” that was pursued by David Callon.
The Old-timers had won.

The influence of dominant actors
Conflict of Strategic Paradigms
At a deeper level, one can observe a conflict
of strategic paradigms between two opposing
camps: the New-timers and Old-timers. The
New-timers believed that Stark should
compete on the basis of service and on-time
delivery, whereas the Old-timers believed that
Stark should complete on the basis of social
capital accumulation and maintenance.
Nowhere was this more evident than at the
centralized order acceptance and delivery
centre.
The centre was the epitome of Stark’s
enterprise integration efforts. By the end of
1999 the strategies of the New-timers had
been inscribed into the centre’s processes
and systems (c.f. Orlikowski, 2000). However,
the centre never achieved the results of the
dream of integration.
This was because the centre was designed to
ensure on-time predictable product delivery
as a key differentiator for competitive
advantage. However, from time to time, Wyatt
Dunkins or the Auckland Sales Manager (of
the Old-timers) would force a large order
through the already congested product
delivery schedule to please a big customer.
This was because, in his view, Stark
depended
on
good
social
capital
accumulation and maintenance with large
customers. These customers would call up on
one day and make demands that their order
be put ahead of others. Wyatt Dunkins did not
want to lose these big customers (and he was
prepared to disadvantage smaller customers
and disrupt the delivery schedule if needed).

After Stark was formed from its constituent
businesses, the New-timers attempted to
develop a single corporate identity and chose
a new ERP system to support the vision of a
more tightly integrated, service-oriented firm.
However this vision, along with the new ERP
system, was diametrically opposed to some
entrenched social structures and the values
of the Old-timers. The Old-timers opposed
the integration effort.
But by the time Stark’s strategic role was
changed back to being a production arm of
the sector, DAREA had already been
inscribed with the intentions of the Newtimers. The company’s ERP system was like
a freight train that was almost impossible to
stop.

Organizational Defensive Routines
We suggest that overcoming organizational
defensive routines may be important in
information technology enabled enterprise
integration projects. Strategic debates on
important, conflicting and sensitive issues are
often implicated in enterprise integration
efforts. We suggest that resolution of these
debates is crucial for a company’s strategic
objectives to be realized in an enterprise
system.
In our analysis, we will focus on just one
issue: the unresolved conflict between the
strategies of the New-timers and Old-timers.
The New-timers advocated competing via
predictable on-time delivery, whereas the
Old-timers
advocated
competing
via
accumulation and preservation of social
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capital. While one might argue that the
pursuit of both strategies was not mutually
exclusive, in Stark they were debated as such.
This unresolved debate can be understood by
drawing on the concepts of single loop
learning, double loop learning and defensive
routines (Argyris, 1990; Argyris and Schon,
1978; Argyris and Schon, 1996).
Figure 4 summarizes the two competing
strategies as single loop learning systems
that were never effectively resolved by
undertaking double loop learning. Double
loop learning could have helped Stark
effectively address apparent but not
fundamental contradictions between the two
strategies. The unresolved strategic debate
trickled down to the design and operations of
the centralized order acceptance and delivery
centre.

In the figure above, both competitive
strategies were concerned with the sales,
marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product to customers. However, the norms
and assumptions of these two competitive
strategies differed. With competitive strategy
1, the results of the order and delivery
process are judged on whether on-time
delivery has been achieved. This is based on
the expectation that predictable reliable ontime delivery over time results in increased
sales volume. With competitive strategy 2,
the results of the order and delivery process
are judged on whether Stark maintained or
enhanced its social capital with its big
customers. The basic rationale of this
strategy is that maintenance of social capital
will eventually result in guaranteed future
sales. With regard to the differences between
the assumptions of the two competitive
strategies, both appear diametrically opposed.

Single Loop Learning at the Strategic Level

Process (Order Acceptance & Delivery)
Inputs

Norms, Strategies & Assumptions
remain untouched by single loop learning

Results
Errors
Detected

Competitive Strategy 1: Competing on Predictable On-Time Delivery
Strategy:

The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Norms:
Predictable Reliable On-Time Delivery results in increased volume sold
Assumptions: By providing reliable on-time delivery to customers, Stark would differentiate
themselves from its competitors

Competitive Strategy 2: Competing on Social Capital
Strategy:

The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Norms:
Maintenance of patronage of big customers equals volume that in turn
translates to maintenance of revenue streams
Assumptions: Serving large customers over time, that in turn develops social capital, is the
most effective manner to maximize corporate effectiveness

Figure 4 - Single Loop Learning at Stark that Results in Unresolved Competing Strategies
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Looking back at Table 1 (concerning Model I
theory in use), we can see that prevalent
norms of interaction in organizations are
based on four governing values as follows:
1. Defining goals and trying to achieve them.
2. Maximizing winning and losing.
3. Minimizing generating or expressing
negative feelings.
4. Being rational.
With Stark, as mentioned above, there were
two schools of thought. David Callon, the
leader of the New-timers, with his team of
senior managers sought to develop the New
Stark World. In a sense, it was natural for
them to “define goals and try to achieve them
unilaterally.” This governing value results in
the following action strategies: “designing and
managing the environment unilaterally by
being persuasive, appealing to larger goals
etc.” David Callon and his team had
attempted to persuade the rest of Stark by
several change programs.
However, the adoption of social norms of
interaction that were consistent with Model I
theory-in-use resulted in “actors seen as
defensive,
inconsistent,
incongruent,
controlling, fearful of being vulnerable,
withholding of feelings, overly concerned
about self and others or under-concerned
about others” as described in Table 1. The
evidence seems to indicate that David Callon
and his team pursued the New Stark
objective and the strategy of on-time product
delivery without letting the Old-timers inquire
into their thought processes. Otherwise, the
inherent conflict between competing via ontime delivery and competing via management
of social capital could have been productively
resolved before the former strategy was
committed to Stark’s ERP system. These
actions ultimately resulted in learning that
was self-sealing and that led to decreased
long term effectiveness (refer to Table 1).

On the other side of the fence, Wyatt Dunkins
of the Old-timers also unilaterally defined
goals and tried to achieve them by attempting
to design and manage the problems and the
environment unilaterally. In doing so, Wyatt
Dunkins attempted to appeal to higher goals,
such as the need to maintain the corporate
social capital to achieve sales volume
necessary to keep Stark afloat. This
imperative was used to justify his actions of
disrupting the product delivery schedule to
maintain corporate social capital. By his
actions, Wyatt Dunkins could have been seen
as defensive, controlling, and being underconcerned about others. Consequently, his
actions within the single loop learning system
illustrated in the previous figure became selfsealing. By self-sealing, we mean that both
camps failed to resolve their conflicting
strategies productively.
Thus the failure to overcome defensive
routines can be considered a major hindrance
to Stark resolving the apparent conflicts
between the two strategies of competition.
Our evidence indicates that David Callon and
his team of New Timers pursued the New
Stark objective and the strategy of on-time
product delivery without any serious debate
with the Old-timers. On the other side of the
fence, Wyatt Dunkins and the Old-timers also
unilaterally defined goals and tried to achieve
them without discussing these with the New
Timers. The result was a lack of productive
debate, the non-achievement of the on-time
delivery
strategy,
and
widespread
dissatisfaction with the ERP system.
It is widely recognized that the linkages
between strategy, strategic objectives, key
performance indicators and the capability
accorded by the enterprise system are crucial
in the realization of benefits in enterprise
systems investments (Davenport, 2000a;
SAP, 2001). However, as the discussion
above shows, unresolved strategic debates
(cf. Argyris and Schon, 1996) may also lead
to a waste of effort in integrating the
enterprise. We suggest the lack of resolution
of these debates may be due to
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organizational defensive routines that prevent
mutual learning taking place.

Limitations
We have suggested that the theory of
organizational defensive routines may help to
explain how organizational learning may be
hindered during the implementation of
enterprise
systems.
However,
we
acknowledge that there are some limitations
of the theory.
First, the theory does not deal with the hidden
agendas and power centres that may
influence strategic shifts, decisions and
posture expressed through the actions of
dominant actors (Myers and Young, 1997).
Second, as a micro-level theory, it does not
take into account wider social and institutional
structures. These structures are much better
handled by a macro-level theory such as
structuration theory (DeSanctis and Poole,
1994; Giddens, 1984; Orlikowski, 2000). We
freely acknowledge that multiple perspectives
are needed to help us understand how to
make enterprise systems work.

Conclusion
Given that enterprise systems are large,
complex systems, involving many different
parts of an organization, it is perhaps not
surprising that implementation failure is not
uncommon (Larsen and Myers, 1999). In this
paper we have focused on organizational
learning as one important aspect of
enterprise systems implementation, or more
precisely, how the lack of organizational
learning may contribute to implementation
failure. Organizational learning is important,
particularly during times of transition from one
technology to another (Boudreau and Robey,
2005).

In this paper we have discussed the
implementation of an enterprise system in a
small-medium sized organization within a
large conglomerate within Australasia. We
have seen that enterprise integration at Stark
was a corporate battleground. A strategically
important debate within Stark was not
resolved before the project to implement a
new enterprise system started. This meant
that the viewpoint of one party (the Newtimers) was subsequently inscribed into
Stark’s enterprise system. Some years later,
however, the Old-Timers gained the
ascendancy, meaning that the ERP was now
ill-suited to support their requirements. The
end result was a new ERP system widely
perceived to be a failure.
We have suggested that organizational
defensive routines hindered the achievement
of a better understanding between the
interested
parties
to
resolve
these
strategically important issues. In our view the
poor outcome could have been avoided if the
strategically important debate within Stark
had been resolved. These organizational
defensive routines meant there was a failure
to learn, which negatively impacted the
implementation of the new ERP system.
We believe our findings may be applicable to
many organisations implementing ERP
systems throughout the world. While the
research
project
was
conducted
in
Australasia, the theory of organizational
defensive routines has been used in many
countries with thousands of managers over a
period of more than 30 years (Argyris, 1993b).
Further research is needed to find out if a
failure to learn is a common feature of
enterprise systems implementation efforts.
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